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Case Note
CRIMINAL LAW—Prejudiced by the Prejudice Prong: Proposing a
New Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Wyoming after
Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, 285 P.3d 248 (Wyo. 2012)
Kellsie J. Nienhuser*
“[T]here is no right more essential than the right to the assistance
of counsel.”1

Introduction
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
accused the right to assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.2 The
purpose of the right to counsel is to ensure criminal defendants receive a fair trial.3
Unfortunately, that essential right appears to be mere dicta when it comes to the
judicial system’s treatment of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.4
In 2012, the Wyoming Supreme Court evaluated whether a Sheridan resident
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel at his murder trial.
In Osborne v. State, Shawn Osborne appealed his first degree murder conviction,
arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective.5 The Wyoming Supreme Court used
the oft-cited standard found in Strickland v. Washington to evaluate the claim.6
Under Strickland, the defendant must show both that counsel’s performance
was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.7 The

* J.D. Candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, 2015. I would like to first and
foremost thank my parents, Greg and Jodie, and my sisters, Jaclyn, Jessica, and Lexie, for their
endless love and support. Thank you to Professor Darrell Jackson, Brian Fuller, Julianne Gern,
Lucas Wallace, and the rest of the Wyoming Law Review Board for their advice and guidance
throughout the writing process. Special thanks to Katie Koski for encouraging me to write for the
Wyoming Law Review and David Singleton for his invaluable input on this topic.
1

Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978).

2

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368 (1993); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,
178 (1986); Daniel Dinger, Successive Interviews and Successful Prosecutions: The Interplay of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine in a Post-Cobb World, 40 Tex. Tech
L. Rev. 917, 921 (2008).
3

4
David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (1973)
(“I have often been told that if my court were to reverse every case in which there was inadequate
counsel, we would have to send back half the convictions in my jurisdiction.”).
5

2012 WY 123, ¶ 18, 285 P.3d 248, 252 (Wyo. 2012).

6

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

7

Id.
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Wyoming Supreme Court held that Osborne did not satisfy the prejudice prong
of the Strickland standard because he failed to show there was a reasonable
probability that counsel’s deficient performance affected the outcome of the case.8
The Strickland standard, as applied by the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Osborne, fails to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and should be
changed.9 Wyoming should adopt a new standard for three reasons. First, the
prejudice prong of the Strickland standard is arbitrary; it is nearly impossible to
prove that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the case would
have been different.10 Second, the reasoning behind the United States Supreme
Court’s adoption of the Strickland standard is flawed.11 Finally, a standard that
considers counsel’s representation in a case as a whole and provides flexibility
within the prejudice prong will better ensure a defendant’s right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment.12

Background
Historical Development of Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.”13 The vague language in the Sixth Amendment’s right
to counsel clause led the United States Supreme Court to interpret the clause in
several cases.14 In 1932, the Supreme Court held that, in capital cases, the Due
Process Clause requires courts to appoint counsel for indigent defendants.15 The
appointment requirement for all criminal defendants did not apply to state courts
until 1963.16 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court extended the right to appointed
counsel to all indigent criminal defendants in the states.17 Regarding the quality
of appointed counsel, the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel is

8

Osborne, ¶ 26, 285 P.3d at 253.

9

See infra notes 106–77 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 115–26 and accompanying text; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”).
10

11

See infra notes 127–52 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 153–77 and accompanying text.

13

U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added).

14

See infra notes 15–68 and accompanying text.

15

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).

16

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

Id. at 342–44. The Court has only extended the right to counsel when the potential penalty
of the crime is incarceration. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972).
17
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the right to effective assistance of counsel.18 This right extends to all criminal
defendants, not just to defendants with appointed counsel.19

Strickland v. Washington
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court developed a
two-prong test for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.20 First, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.21 Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.22
The first prong of the test evaluates whether counsel’s performance was
deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness “under prevailing
professional norms.”23 The Court did not expressly define “prevailing professional
norms,” but instead addressed the basic duties of counsel and suggested that lower
courts look to the ABA Standards for guidance.24 Counsel’s basic duties include:
a duty of loyalty, a duty to advocate, a duty to consult with the defendant, a
duty to keep the defendant informed, and a duty to use his skill to provide
the defendant with a fair trial.25 In evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s
representation, a court will look not only at these basic duties but also at counsel’s
performance “considering all the circumstances.”26 The United States Supreme
Court also stated that in a court’s evaluation of counsel’s representation, the court
must give deference to counsel and presume that counsel has represented his
client effectively.27
Showing that counsel made errors in representation does not, in and of itself,
mean representation was ineffective.28 Rather, the errors must have an “adverse
effect on the defense.”29 In order to satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant
18

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).

19

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1980).

20

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

Id. (“This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”).
21

22
Id. (“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”).
23

Id. at 688–89.

Id. The Court suggests looking to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d
ed. 1980) (“The Defense Function”).
24

25

Id. at 688.

26

Id.

Id. at 689–90. The Court reasons that this strong presumption that counsel’s conduct is
reasonable is important because “[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.” Id. at 689.
27

28

Id. at 693.

29

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 1, Art. 6

164

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceedings would have been different.”30
The United States Supreme Court found that failure to inform the defendant
about negative immigration consequences met the Strickland standard for
ineffectiveness.31 The Court also found ineffective assistance where counsel had
failed to discover defendant’s prior convictions.32 Comparatively, counsel’s failure
to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase was not enough for
the United States Supreme Court to find ineffective assistance.33 The Court also
held that counsel did not need express consent from defendant about counsel’s
strategy for conceding guilt in a capital trial.34

Reasoning Behind the Strickland Standard
The United States Supreme Court offered a number of reasons for adopting
the Strickland standard. First, the Court stated that the purpose behind ineffective
assistance of counsel claims is “not to improve the quality of legal representations,
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system.35 The
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”36 Second,
the Court voiced concern over the effect that ineffective assistance claims will have
on the judicial system.37 Efficiency of the judicial system and having “too many”
30

Id. at 694.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010) (“Padilla’s counsel provided him false
assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this country. This is not a hard
case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from
reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice
was incorrect.”).
31

32
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (“[T]he failure to examine Rompilla’s prior
conviction file fell below the level of reasonable performance [because] [c]ounsel knew that the
Commonwealth intended to seek the death penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant history of
felony convictions.”).
33

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007).

34

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 189–90 (2004).

35

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).

36

Id. at 689.
The term ‘fair trial’ is often used, but not often defined. It is of broad scope. While
we shall not undertake to give a formal definition of the term, yet it may not be amiss
to mention, in part at least, its content . . . It means a trial before an impartial judge,
an impartial jury, and in an atmosphere of judicial calm . . . Being impartial means
being indifferent as between the parties . . . . It means that, while the judge may and
should direct and control the proceedings, and may exercise his right to comment on
the evidence, yet he may not extend his activities so far as to become in effect either
an assisting prosecutor or a thirteenth juror.

Goldstein v. United States, 63 F.2d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 1933) (quoting Sunderland v. United States,
19 F.2d 202, 216 (8th Cir. 1927)).
37

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims was a concern of the Court.38 Third, the
Court also worried about counsels’ reaction to court scrutiny: “Intensive scrutiny
of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the
ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance
of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.”39 Finally,
the Supreme Court validated the prejudice prong by looking again at the purpose
of the Sixth Amendment.40 The Court reasoned that the purpose of ensuring a
fair trial is achieved so long as the outcome of the proceeding is not prejudiced by
counsel’s errors.41
In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court looked at counsel’s
obligations under “prevailing professional norms.”42 The Court held in Porter
v. McCollum that “under prevailing professional norms . . . counsel had an
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”43
The United States Supreme Court has also held that counsel fell short of these
professional norms when he did not expand the “investigation beyond the
presentence investigation report and one set of records they obtained.”44

Criticisms of the Strickland Standard
There have been a number of criticisms from courts and commentators
regarding the effect and use of the Strickland standard.45 In 1994, Supreme
Court Justice Blackmun said, “[t]en years after the articulation of [the Strickland]
standard, practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application,
has failed to protect a defendant’s right to be represented by something more than
‘a person who happens to be a lawyer.’”46 Blackmun argued that the Strickland
standard had failed because defendants are not likely to be able to demonstrate
that counsel was ineffective, “given the low standard for acceptable attorney
conduct and the high showing of prejudice required under [the standard].”47
Id. (“The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.”).
38

39

Id.

40

Id. at 691–92.

41

Id.

See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
524–25 (2003).
42

43

Porter, 558 U.S. at 39.

44

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524–25.

See Paul J. Kelly, Jr., Are We Prepared to Offer Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 45 St. Louis
U. L.J. 1089 (2001); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
Md. L. Rev. 1433 (1999); Patrick S. Metze, Speaking Truth to Power of the Courts to Enforce the Right
to Counsel at Trial, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 163 (2012).
45

46

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

47

Id.
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In jurisdictions where the Strickland standard is used, members of the
judiciary have expressed their concerns about the standard in dissenting and
concurring opinions.48 A Pennsylvania Superior Court judge wrote a dissenting
opinion arguing for the adoption of a new standard: “The [S]ixth [A]mendment
guarantee does not extend only to someone who should have been acquitted.
It therefore does not require proof of prejudice. It says nothing about ‘guilt’ or
‘prejudice’. What it does refer to, and guarantees, is ‘assistance of counsel’ . . . to
innocent and guilty alike.”49 The judge stated that once a defendant proves his
counsel was ineffective, the burden should shift to the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the counsel’s incompetence was a harmless error.50 Under
Strickland, the criminal defendant always has the burden to prove prejudice.51 A
Texas Criminal Court of Appeals’ judge also found the prejudice prong erroneous:
“[R]epresentation by an attorney whose performance is so deficient as to violate
his own client’s constitutional right . . . is exactly the kind of egregious failure that
should undermine everyone’s confidence in the verdict.”52

Alternatives to Strickland
Some courts have moved toward standards that better ensure a defendant’s
right to counsel.53 The Supreme Court of Hawaii has expressly rejected the
Strickland standard in evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, realizing
that it is “unduly difficult for a defendant to meet.”54 In order to show ineffective
assistance of counsel under the standard used in Hawaii, the claimant must
show that there were “‘specific errors or omissions . . . reflecting counsel’s lack
of skill, judgment or diligence,’ and ‘these errors or omissions resulted in either
the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.’”55
Like the Strickland standard, the Hawaiian test has two prongs. First, a claimant
must show “specific errors or omissions.”56 This is similar to the deficiency prong
of the Strickland standard.57 Second, the claimant must show that “these errors
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garvin, 485 A.2d 36, 49–50. (Pa. Super. 1984) (Brosky, J., dissenting); Derrick v. State, 773 S.W.2d 271, 280, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (Teague, J., dissenting).
48

49

Garvin, 485 A.2d at 49–50.

50

Id.

51

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

John M. Burkoff & Nancy M. Burkoff, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel § 2:7
(2013) (citing Derrick v. State, 773 S.W.2d 271, 280, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (Teague,
J., dissenting)).
52

53

See infra notes 54–68 and accompanying text.

54

State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7 (Haw. 1986).

55

Id. at 500 (quoting State v. Kahalewai, 501 P.2d 977, 980 (Haw. 1972)).

56

Id.

Compare Smith, 712 P.2d at 500 (requiring defendant to show “specific errors or omissions”),
with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring defendant to show that
“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”).
57

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/6

6

Nienhuser: Criminal Law - Prejudiced by the Prejudice Prong: Proposing a New

2014

Case Note

167

resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially
meritorious defense.”58 The requirement for a “potentially meritorious defense” is
a lower bar than the requirement in Strickland where a claimant must prove the
outcome of the case would have been different.59
The Supreme Court of Alaska made the prejudice prong less demanding
by requiring only that the accused create a reasonable doubt that counsel’s
incompetence contributed to the outcome.60 The requirements to meet this
prejudice prong are less onerous than what is required under Strickland.61
The New York Court of Appeals also discarded the traditional prejudice
component.62 In New York, “‘[s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the
circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the
representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation,’ a
defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel will have
been met.”63 The Court of Appeals referred to it as a flexible approach and
focused its attention on the phrase “meaningful representation.”64 Meaningful
representation has a prejudice component, but rather than judging the counsel’s
influence on the outcome of the case, the Court of Appeals requires consideration
of the “fairness of the process as a whole.”65 The court considered this to mean
that “[a]s long as the defense reflects a reasonable and legitimate strategy under
the circumstances and evidence presented, even if unsuccessful, it will not fall
to the level of ineffective assistance.”66 The burden rests with the defendant to
demonstrate the absence of a legitimate strategy.67 Similar to Strickland, judicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. 68

Wyoming Law on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Wyoming Constitution recognizes the right to counsel and states that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person
58

Smith, 712 P.2d at 500.

Compare Smith, 712 P.2d at 500 (requiring “substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense”), with Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (requiring a “reasonable probability
that . . . the result of the proceedings would have been different”).
59

60

Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 425 (Alaska 1974).

61

Id.

62

The Court of Appeals is the highest court in New York.

People v. Henry, 744 N.E.2d 112, 113 (N.Y. 2000) (quoting People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d
400, 405 (N.Y. 1981)).
63

64

Henry, 744 N.E.2d at 113.

65

Id. at 114.

66

People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. 1998).

67

People v. Taylor, 802 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (N.Y. 2003).

68

People v. Turner, 840 N.E.2d 123, 125 (N.Y. 2005).
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and by counsel . . . .”69 In 1985, Wyoming adopted the Strickland standard in
Munden v. State.70 Since, then, the Wyoming Supreme Court has applied the
standard in numerous cases to determine claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.71 The Wyoming Supreme Court, like the United States Supreme Court,
gives considerable deference to counsel, presuming that counsel’s performance
was effective.72 The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that “the benchmark
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.”73 Counsel error alone is not enough
to set aside a judgment if the error had no effect on the outcome of the case.74
Thus, “[a]n ineffectiveness claim may be disposed of solely on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice.”75 The Wyoming Supreme Court’s application of the
prejudice prong is directly in line with Strickland’s application.76
In Calene v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court established the procedure
for appellate review of ineffective assistance claims.77 Under Calene, a criminal
defendant can bring an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.78 The Court will then remand the case to the trial court where
defendant will be allowed an evidentiary hearing to present additional evidence
regarding the ineffective counsel claim.79 After the hearing, the district court will
issue a decision.80 If the district court does not find ineffective assistance, the
defendant may appeal the claim back to the Wyoming Supreme Court.81
69

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 10.

70

698 P.2d 621, 623 (Wyo. 1985).

See, e.g., Jacobsen v. State, 2012 WY 105, ¶ 15, 281 P.3d 356, 359–60 (Wyo. 2012);
Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 3, 201 P.3d 434, 436 (Wyo. 2009); Barkell v. State, 55 P.3d 1239,
1242 (Wyo. 2002); Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 611–12 (Wyo. 1992); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d
135, 145 (Wyo. 1986).
71

72

Munden, 698 P.2d at 623 (Wyo. 1985).

73

Id.

74

Id.

Mickelson v. State, 2012 WY 137, ¶ 16, 287 P.3d 750, 755 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Jenkins
v. State, 2011 WY 141, ¶ 6, 262 P.3d 552, 555 (Wyo. 2011)).
75

76
The Wyoming Supreme Court recognizes a narrow set of circumstances where prejudice is
presumed. Prejudice will be presumed when there is a complete denial of counsel, where “counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” and when counsel
is appointed so close to trial that it amounts to ineffective assistance. Sincock v. State, 76 P.3d 323,
337 (Wyo. 2003).
77

846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993); Wyo. R. App. P. § 21.

78

Calene, 846 P.2d at 679; Wyo. R. App. P. § 21.

Calene, 846 P.2d at 683. Additional evidence presented would include “testimony of the
trial lawyer, the accused, and a requirement for the convicted defendant to demonstrate a viable
factual basis which would support his claim regarding the claimed adverse quality of representation
he was provided.” Id.
79

80

Id.

81

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss1/6

8

Nienhuser: Criminal Law - Prejudiced by the Prejudice Prong: Proposing a New

2014

Case Note

169

The Wyoming Supreme Court has provided further guidance for evaluating
ineffective assistance claims. The court held that counsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.82 The court also held that when the claim is based
upon the failure to call an expert witness, the defendant must show an expert was
available who would have testified consistently with his theory.83 However, even if
the defendant can show that counsel did not reasonably investigate or unreasonably
failed to call an expert witness, a defendant still must show prejudice.84

Principal Case
Facts
In 2010, the State charged Shawn Osborne with first degree murder.85 On
January 15, 2010, Osborne confessed to a roommate that he had killed Gerald
Bloom.86 Osborne pled not guilty by reason of mental illness.87 At trial, Osborne’s
counsel, a public defender, attempted to show that, due to Osborne’s intoxication,
he was unable to form the specific intent necessary to be convicted of first degree
murder.88 Osborne’s counsel called witnesses and presented evidence to show that
Osborne had been under the influence of alcohol and Adderall prior to killing Mr.
Bloom, and that he had a history of being a heavy drinker.89 The jury subsequently
convicted Osborne of first degree murder and sentenced him to life in prison.90

82

Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶ 29, 86 P.3d 851, 860 (Wyo. 2004).

83

Id. at ¶ 30, 86 P.3d at 860.

84

Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, ¶ 20, 285 P.3d 248, 252 (Wyo. 2012).

Id. at ¶ 3, 285 P.3d at 249. The State charged Osborne under section 6-2-101(a) of the
Wyoming Statutes. Id.
85

86

Id.

Id. at ¶ 6, 285 P.3d at 250. Osborne was subsequently evaluated twice at the Wyoming
State Hospital. Physicians found he was mentally fit for trial pursuant to section 7-11-301 of the
Wyoming Statutes, and he did not lack the capacity at the time of the killing to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct. Id.
87

88
Id. at ¶ 11, 285 P.3d at 251. Self-induced intoxication of the defendant is not a defense to
a criminal charge except to the extent that in any prosecution evidence of self-induced intoxication
of the defendant may be offered when it is relevant to negate the existence of a specific intent which
is an element of the crime. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-202(a) (2013).
89
Osborne, ¶¶ 7, 11, 21, 285 P.3d at 250–53. Adderall is a central nervous system stimulant
prescribed for the treatment of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Side effects of Adderall,
including bipolar illness, aggressive behavior, and hostility have been reported. See Medication
Guide Adderall XR, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DrugSafety/ucm085819.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
90

Osborne, ¶ 16, 285 P.3d at 252.
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Motion for a New Trial
After sentencing, Osborne filed a motion for a new trial and argued that his
counsel was ineffective because his counsel had failed to seek expert testimony
to explain substance abuse delirium to the jury.91 The district court conducted
a Calene hearing to evaluate the claim.92 Osborne’s new counsel presented
testimony from trial counsel and from an expert on substance abuse delirium.93
The district court concluded that “any deficient performance by trial counsel
did not sufficiently prejudice Mr. Osborne’s defense to warrant granting a new
trial.94 Since Osborne failed to meet the prejudice prong, the district court did not
address whether counsel’s actions constituted a deficiency under the Strickland
standard.95 The court sentenced Osborne to life in prison without the possibility of
parole.96 Osborne appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court, asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to adequately investigate and seek
expert assistance.97

Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Kite wrote for the court affirming the district court’s finding
that trial counsel’s performance did not sufficiently prejudice Osborne’s defense
to warrant a new trial.98 The Wyoming Supreme Court evaluated Osborne’s
claim under Strickland.99 In affirming Osborne’s conviction, the court found
that Osborne failed the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard because he
failed to show that a reasonable probability existed that defense counsel’s failure
to investigate and provide an expert witness affected the outcome of the case.100
The court stated: “The evidence against Mr. Osborne was overwhelming . . . .
Even with such expert testimony, we conclude the probability in this case is that
the jury would convict Mr. Osborne of first degree murder.”101

91

Id. at ¶ 15, 285 P.3d at 251–52.

92

Id.

93

Id. at ¶ 16, 285 P.3d at 252.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id. at ¶ 18, 285 P.3d at 252.

98

Id. at ¶ 26, 285 P.3d at 253.

99

Id. at ¶ 19, 285 P.3d at 252.

Id. at ¶ 26–27, 285 P.3d at 253; Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d 1049,
1058 (Wyo. 2005) (“‘Reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”).
100

101

Osborne, ¶ 26, 285 P.3d at 253.
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Concurring Opinion
Justice Voigt wrote a special concurrence to express his objections to the
Strickland standard: “The problem is that, while it is often relatively easy to
prove defense counsel’s deficient performance, it is practically impossible to prove
prejudice because it is practically impossible to prove that the outcome would
have been different had the jury been allowed to hear certain evidence.”102 Justice
Voigt also pointed out that proving the outcome would have been different is
even more difficult under the Wyoming system because the system does not allow
a defendant to ask the jury about its deliberations.103 Justice Voigt determined that
the counsel’s deficiency in this case was “glaring,” and implied that the evidence
might have not been as “overwhelming” had counsel provided the jury with
contrary evidence.104 Justice Voigt disagreed with the standard by emphasizing
the importance of one’s right to counsel: “The point I wish to make is that where
defense counsel’s performance has been shown to be so ineffective as to deprive
the defendant of that counsel assured him by the Sixth Amendment, we cannot
rely upon the adversarial process as having produced a just trial.”105

Analysis
Justice Voigt correctly concluded that the Strickland standard does not
effectively protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.106 Wyoming
should adopt a new standard similar to the New York Court of Appeals’ standard.107
New York’s standard focuses on the quality of counsel, incorporates the prejudice
prong by looking at whether the process as a whole was fair, and better achieves a
fair trial.108 This test hones in on counsel’s performance by considering the totality
of the circumstances rather than inferring whether or not counsel’s deficient
performance affected the outcome of the case, as is required by Strickland.109

102

Id. at ¶ 28, 285 P.3d at 253 (citation omitted).

103

Id. at ¶ 28, 285 P.3d at 253–54.

104

Id. at ¶ 30, 285 P.3d at 254.

Id. at ¶ 31, 285 P.3d at 254 (“I concur in the result reached by the majority because that
result is mandated by precedent.”).
105

106

See supra note 102–105 and accompanying text.

107

See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.

108

People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588 (N.Y. 1998).

See supra notes 62– 68 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Wyoming has used
the totality of the circumstances test in its analysis of criminal procedure issues. See, e.g., Flood v.
State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 22, 169 P.3d 538, 545 (Wyo. 2007) (“In determining whether the officer
had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, we look to the totality of the circumstances
and how those circumstances developed during the officer’s encounter with the occupants of the
vehicle.”); Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶ 5, 142 P.3d 1155, 1158–59 (Wyo. 2006) (“The judicial
officer who is presented with an application for a search warrant supported by an affidavit applies
a ‘totality of circumstances’ analysis in making an independent judgment whether probable cause
109
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Strickland considered the totality of the circumstances only in the application of
the deficiency prong.110 With this standard, the deficient performance prong is
still required, but the prejudice prong is more workable.111 The New York Court
of Appeals’ standard relates more closely to the objective of achieving a fair trial
than Strickland, or the standards used in other states, and is more feasible for
defendants to meet.
There are three reasons why this standard should be adopted in Wyoming.
First, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test is an arbitrary standard; it is nearly
impossible to prove that the outcome of the case would have been different but
for counsel’s deficient performance.112 Second, the reasoning behind the United
States Supreme Court’s adoption of the Strickland standard is flawed.113 Finally,
the new standard will better ensure a defendant’s right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment.114

The Prejudice Prong is an Arbitrary Standard
Justice Voigt argued in the Osborne concurrence that it is practically impossible
to show that the jury would have decided the case differently had they heard
certain evidence.115 The prejudice prong asks the reviewing judge to speculate as
to what the jury would have decided had the evidence been introduced.116 What
would they have decided if certain evidence was presented by counsel? Would
they have found the defendant guilty if a certain witness testified? A judge cannot
be sure of the answers.117 Given that all jury deliberations are sacrosanct, a judge
can never determine with reliability if and how the result would be different.118
exists for the issuance of the warrant.”); State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Wyo. 1997) (“State
has burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence under totality of the circumstances, that
a confession, admission, or statement was given voluntarily.”).
110

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

111

Id.

112

See infra notes 115–26 and accompanying text.

113

See infra notes 127–52 and accompanying text.

114

See infra notes 153–77 and accompanying text.

115

Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d 248, 253–54 (Voigt, J., concurring).

See Marcus Procter Henderson, Truly Ineffective Assistance: A Comparison of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in the United States of American and the United Kingdom, 13 Ind. Int’l & Comp.
L. Rev. 317, 331 (2002) (“[T]he prejudice prong of the Strickland test often makes it impossible
to conclude whether there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.”).
116

117
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“On the
basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how . . .
evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd,
well-prepared lawyer.”).

Craig B. Wills, Juror Misconduct: Balancing the Need for Secret Deliberations with the Right to
a Fair & Impartial Trial, 72-May Fla. B.J. 20 (1998) (“Secret deliberations by citizen jurors without
public review and criticism has been one of the hallmarks of the American justice system. The courts
118
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He can only make a subjective guess as to how the case would have turned out.
In effect, a judge gets to conclude how a case would play out if certain evidence
were admitted or if counsel did not make certain errors.119 In part, jurors evaluate
credibility; they use it to decide what evidence to believe.120 Credibility is
established through the trial and the steps both parties take. A judge should not
get to decide how credible the evidence might be.121 “The ultimate determination
of the credibility or truthfulness of a witness is not ‘a fact in issue,’ but a matter to
be generally determined solely by the jury.”122
Wyoming statistics also reflect the assertion that the Strickland standard is
difficult to prove.123 The Wyoming Supreme Court considered sixty-six ineffective
assistance cases in the last ten years, and in only eight of these cases did the
Wyoming Supreme Court find ineffective assistance.124 Of the fifty-eight cases
where the Strickland standard was not met, twenty-five cases held that only the
prejudice prong was not met.125 In fifteen of the sixty-six ineffective assistance
cases, the Court held that both the deficiency and prejudice prong failed.126

The Reasoning behind the Strickland Standard is Flawed
Wyoming should adopt a new standard because the Strickland standard
is flawed in numerous ways. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court
dismissed any purpose for the test other than ensuring a fair trial; it explicitly

repeatedly have expressed the principle that post-trial juror interviews rarely should be granted and
the sanctity of the jury process, as well as the privacy rights of the jurors, should be closely guarded
and protected.”).
119

Id.

E.g., Simmons v. State, 687 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1984); Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330,
1332 (Wyo. 1974).
120

121
Wilson v. Corestaff Services L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
(“[C]redibility is a matter solely for the jury.”); see John B. Meixner, Liar, Liar, Jury’s the Trier? The
Future of Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment in the Court, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1451 (2012).
122

Simmons, 687 P.2d at 258; Montez, 527 P.2d at 1332.

See Munoz v. State, 2013 WY 94, ¶ 16, 308 P.3d 829, 834 (Wyo. 2013) (“What is striking
is . . . although we recognize the right to a fair trial, we almost never find that a trial was unfair—no
matter what happened!”).
123

124
See Appendix. It is important to note that the sixty-six cases discussed in this analysis are
only the cases appealed by defendants after the Calene hearing at the trial court level.

See, e.g., Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, ¶ 26, 285 P.3d 248, 253 (Wyo. 2012); Jenkins
v. State, 2011 WY 141, ¶ 1, 262 P.3d 552, 554 (Wyo. 2011); Baker v. State, 2010 WY 6, ¶ 42, 223
P.3d 542, 558 (Wyo. 2010); Floyd v. State, 2006 WY 135, ¶ 16, 144 P.3d 1233, 1239 (Wyo. 2006);
May v. State, 62 P.3d 574, 586 (Wyo. 2003).
125

126
See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 2012 WY 17, ¶ 25, 270 P.3d 648, 655 (Wyo. 2012); Carter v.
State, 2010 WY 136, ¶ 24, 241 P.3d 476, 489 (Wyo. 2010); Cross v. State, 2009 WY 154, ¶ 10, 221
P.3d 972, 975 (Wyo. 2009); Wease v. State, 2007 WY 176, ¶ 61, 170 P.3d 94, 116 (Wyo. 2007);
Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 81, 99 P.3d 928, 952 (Wyo. 2004).
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stated that the goal is not to improve the quality of legal representations.127 The
logic of this statement seems misguided. The purpose might not be to directly
improve the quality of legal representation, but a defendant cannot rely on his
constitutional right to counsel without an attorney of sufficient quality to actually
provide an effective defense and a fair trial.128 Defendants should be afforded
more than merely non-prejudicial assistance. “A fair trial is an adversarial trial.”129
An adversarial system requires counsel to advocate for their client. If the quality
of counsel suffers, so will the level of advocacy.
The United States Supreme Court also based its decision in Strickland on
preventing an excess of ineffective assistance claims and assuring efficiency of the
judicial system.130 The Court believed that ineffective assistance of counsel appeals
would burden the judicial system.131 Efficiency appeared at the forefront of the
Strickland court’s analysis, while the true purpose of the Strickland standard, to
evaluate claims of ineffective assistance, is put on the back burner.132 However,
the concern for “too many court cases” does not outweigh the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right.
Where there is an essential constitutional right, the importance of ensuring
that right far outweighs the concern of “opening the floodgates to litigation.”133
The Constitution, the supreme law of the land, noticeably trumps this overused
policy consideration.134 “Although there are judicial efficiency and cost concern
. . . what courts should always keep in mind as their paramount concern is the
constitutional demand that criminal trials be fair.”135
127

See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.

Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1259, 1275 n.90
(1986) (“[T]he adversary system is a necessary ingredient in a fair trial; a fair trial is an adversarial
trial.” (quoting Martin P. Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice, Phil. L. 98, 116 (R.
Bronaugh ed. 1978))).
128

129

Id.

130

See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.

131

See Burkoff & Burkoff, supra note 52, at § 1:6 (2012).

See Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy and Effective Assistance of Counsel
in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 59, 67 (1986) (suggesting that Strickland’s
primary purpose is to “help reviewing courts deal efficiently with these claims rather than seriously
consider the potential injustice caused by incompetent trial counsel”).
132

133
Timothy M. Riselvato, Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Clash of the Federal
and New York State Constitutions, 26 Touro L. Rev. 1195, 1210 (2011) (“The Supreme Court
in Strickland appears to have been operating under a fear of opening the proverbial floodgates
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Court has no doubt satisfied its agenda in that
regard, because the Strickland standard is plainly more burdensome and will defeat a larger amount
of claims.”).
134
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).

Nathan Oswald, In Defense of Fairness: Protecting the Adversarial Process When a Pro Se
Criminal Defendant is Removed from the Courtroom, 41 U. Tol. L. Rev. 735, 736 (2010).
135
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Also, the United States Supreme Court justified its highly deferential standard
of review when scrutinizing counsel’s performance by emphasizing the importance
of the attorney-client relationship, the independence of defense counsel’s decisions,
and defense counsel’s commitment to representing defendants.136 The amount of
deference allotted to counsel in these ineffective assistance claims is erroneous.137
It is permissible for a court to presume that counsel performed effectively until
the defendant proves otherwise, but Strickland’s emphasis on the high level of
deference and the strong presumption signals to courts that there are rare cases in
which they should second-guess counsel’s conduct in representing a client.138 An
attorney’s job is to be an advocate for the client.139 It seems reasonable to require
that advocates should be able to justify their conduct and strategy to the court if
the defendant shows that counsel made errors.140
The Supreme Court’s reasoning that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment
is satisfied so long as the outcome is not prejudiced by counsel’s errors is
erroneous.141 As previously discussed, the stated goal of the Strickland standard
is to ensure a fair trial.142 However, a fair trial is not necessarily achieved merely
because a defendant would have been convicted despite counsel’s blatant
errors. The prejudice prong impermissibly excludes instances of counsel’s gross
malpractice.143 The cases where counsel’s performance was clearly deficient, yet the

136

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

137

See infra note 138 and accompanying text.

Whitney Crawley, Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents the Court’s Increasing
Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 1139, 1140
(2007) (“Yet our courts have taken a passive stance . . . giving broad deference to attorney decisions,
and attributing errors and omissions to sound trial strategy. This passivity allows questionable
attorney conduct to go undeterred, thus perpetuating poor quality legal representation.”).
138

139
140

See, e.g., Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. ¶ 2.
Richard Klein had this to say on the subject:
Courts do not follow a ‘highly deferential’ standard of review when evaluating the
work of other professions. Nor is there a ‘strong presumption’ that the professional
acted reasonably. The standard is ‘reasonable professional competence’ for malpractice
suits against physicians and surgeons, accountants, and architects. Certainly the harm
and loss of liberty resulting to a defendant because of an incompetent attorney may
be far greater than the damage done to a client of a negligent accountant or architect.

Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 625, 640–41 (1986) (disagreeing with
high deference).
141

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

142

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 18
Crim. Just. 37, 38 (2003) (“In other words, where there was overwhelming proof of guilt at trial,
malpractice will be excused if that malpractice involved such egregious behavior as sleeping, taking
drugs, or drinking during trial, suffering through a psychotic break, or any number of disasters that
have been so extensively reported by journalists and scholars alike.”).
143
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court determined the defendant to be overwhelmingly guilty, look nothing like a
fair trial.144 For example, in Jacobsen v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court found
that “the evidence against [defendant] was so overwhelming that she was not
prejudiced by any ineffectiveness.”145 With a progressive judicial system like the
one in the United States, it is inexcusable to allow an attorney to represent a client
poorly and justify his errors by concluding that the jury would have convicted the
client anyway.146
Critics have pointed out that “[m]any ineffective assistance problems are
systemic problems: poor appointment systems, weak and underfinanced public
defender and defense support systems, a weak defense bar, and undertrained
attorneys . . . [E]ven skilled counsel may be made ineffective by a lack of time of
time or money.”147 Merely masking the problem and allowing the quality of the
system to remain poor is not a solution. The legal community must address these
problems rather than settling for mediocre representation. These criticisms of the
criminal justice system do not excuse deficient performance of counsel. A lack
of resources is often a concern of our government. In Wyoming’s budget request
for the Office of the Public Defender for the 2007-2008 fiscal year, the agency
noted that the “caseload continues to increase without a comparable increase
in resources.”148 In 2004, the average caseload for an attorney was roughly 250
cases.149 It sharply increased in 2005 to over 275 cases.150 Despite the increase in
caseloads, the number of cases finding ineffective assistance declined from two in

144
Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, ¶ 26, 285 P.3d 248, 253 (Wyo. 2012) (“The evidence
against Mr. Osborne was overwhelming. Given the strength of that evidence, we simply are not
persuaded that a reasonable probability exists that but for any failure on defense counsel’s part to
investigate and present expert evidence concerning substance abuse delirium, the outcome would
have been different.”).
145

Jacobsen v. State, 2012 WY 105, ¶ 2, 281 P.3d 356, 357 (Wyo. 2012).

Alfredo Garcia, The Sixth Amendment in Modern American Jurisprudence: A
Critical Perspective 30 (1992) (“Vigorous representation by effective counsel is central to the
legitimacy . . . of the adversary system. Because the theory upon which the adversary system rests
is that the ‘truth’ is ‘best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question,’ the
Court has on numerous occasions underscored the importance of effective counsel in the criminal
process.” (citations omitted)).
146

147
See Burkoff & Burkoff, supra note 52, at § 1:7 (2012) (citing Gary Goodpaster, The
Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L.
& Soc. Change 59, 66, 75 (1986)). In State v. Miller, defendant, Terrence Miller, did not meet
his substituted trial attorney until the morning of his suppression hearing and trial. Nevertheless,
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division found that defendant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel. 18 A.3d 1054, 1056 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).

State of Wyoming Biennium Budget Request: Office of the Public Defender, Dep’t of Admin.
& Info. Budget Div., (2007–2008), http://ai.state.wy.us/budget/pdf/0708BudgetRequest/008.
pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
148

149

Id.

150

Id.
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2004 to zero in 2005. Another impeding budget concern in Wyoming is the cost
of expert services. The amount of funds requested for expert services in 20072008 was $228,388.151 Given that witnesses in complex felony cases can cost
anywhere from $20,000 to $60,000 or more per case, the available funds may be
exhausted all too quickly.152 Though asking the legislature for additional resources
could help with the problem, it would be a better, and more permanent, solution
to combat the quality concern by motivating defense attorneys through a more
stringent judicial standard.

A Better Standard
Wyoming should adopt a standard that considers counsel’s representation
in a case as a whole, rather than the Strickland standard’s use of an outcomedeterminative prejudice prong. The New York Court of Appeals’ standard focuses
on whether, in looking at the totality of the circumstances, counsel provided
meaningful representation to a defendant.153 Its flexibility makes the test more
feasible to apply than the Strickland standard, yet it still incorporates a prejudice
component that requires more than mere counsel error to show ineffective
assistance.154 More importantly it focuses on “fairness of the process,” which better
achieves the Sixth Amendment’s purpose.155 “The safeguards provided under the
Constitution must be applied in all cases to be effective and, for that reason, ‘our
legal system is concerned as much with integrity of the judicial process as with
the issue of guilt or innocence.’”156 Flexibility is especially important to ineffective
assistance claims because what constitutes effective assistance “cannot be fixed
with yardstick precision, but varies according to the unique circumstances of
each representation.”157
The meaningful representation standard allows the court to look at the
whole picture. It does not allow a court to dismiss error simply because of
“overwhelming” evidence against the defendant.158 The New York Court of

151

Id.

Id. (“To defend a death penalty case at the trial level requires a minimum of $100,000
to $250,000—depending upon the complexity of the case, the need for expert witnesses, and the
issues in the case.”).
152

153

See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.

154

Id.

155

People v. Henry, 744 N.E.2d 112, 114 (N.Y. 2000).

People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588 (N.Y. 1998) (quoting People v. Donovan, 193
N.E.2d 628, 631 (N.Y. 1963)).
156

157

People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400, 404 (N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted).

See Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, ¶ 26, 285 P.3d 248, 253 (Wyo. 2012) (“The evidence
against Mr. Osborne was overwhelming.”); Jacobsen v. State, 2012 WY 105, ¶ 2, 281 P.3d 356. 357
(Wyo. 2012) (“[T]he evidence against her was so overwhelming.”).
158

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

17

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 1, Art. 6

178

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

Appeals has held that “[i]n delineating what is meaningful, however, it would
be unwise and possibly misleading to create a grid or carve in stone a standard
by which to measure effectiveness.”159 The meaningful representation approach
takes into consideration the variation in trial strategies among attorneys.160
“[A]dvocacy is meaningful if it reflects a competent grasp of the facts, the law, and
[ ] procedure supported by appropriate authority and argument.”161 It does not
require “perfect representation” and does not alter the presumption that counsel
performed effectively.162 However, the high deference given to counsel should not
be adopted.163 An intermediate level of deference is enough to ensure that counsel
has the freedom to represent their client as they see fit without enduring too much
scrutiny.164 Too much deference will influence the court excessively by inhibiting
them from critically comparing counsel’s strategies to what is reasonably accepted
in practice.165
However, adoption of a new standard is not enough to change how
ineffective assistance claims are viewed in the eyes of the court.166 “Meaningful
representation” is flexible, and with flexibility comes variation in the application
of the law. The attitude among courts has to change. Courts need to approach

159

People v. Stultz, 810 N.E.2d 883, 888 (N.Y. 2004).

Id. (“Just as defense attorneys enjoy a wide latitude in defending clients at the trial level,
appellate lawyers vary in style and approach. A lengthy brief may be a virtue in some instances but
not in others. Some arguments properly emphasize two or three cogent issues while others may raise
a multiplicity of claims.”).
160

161

Id.

People v. Henry, 744 N.E.2d 112, 113 (N.Y. 2000) (“The Constitution guarantees a
defendant a fair trial, not a perfect one.”).
162

Kelly Green, There’s Less in This Than Meets the Eye: Why Wiggins Doesn’t Fix Strickland and
What the Court Should Do Instead, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 647, 648 (2005) (“Strickland’s high deference to
counsel’s strategic choices allows appellate courts to view egregious errors as trial tactics.”).
163

Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judicial Independence: Independence
in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006) (“The amount of deference ranges from
de novo review (no deference), to an intermediate level of deference based on persuasiveness, to a
broad level of deference to the views of an agency as long as its interpretation is reasonable.”).
164

165
See Marcus Procter Henderson, Truly Ineffective Assistance: A Comparison of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in the United States of American and the United Kingdom, 13 Ind. Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 317, 334 (2002) (“Court’s deference toward defense counsel reflects its goal of
efficiency. However, that does not entitle the defendant to a ‘dynamic, strong defense.’ Rather, it
only provides the defendant with ‘minimally effective assistance of counsel.’ As a result, valuing
efficiency over justice neglects both the purpose and spirit of Gideon.” (citations omitted)).
166
See Burkoff & Burkoff, supra note 52, at § 1:3 (2012) (“There is an apparent disinclination
on the part of judges to scrutinize too readily or intensively the conduct of defense counsel . . . for
fear of the counterproductive effect such scrutiny might have on the attorney-client relationship
required for the effective operation of our system.”).
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ineffective assistance claims as a protection of a constitutional right rather than
an infringement on an attorney’s freedom to choose their strategy in representing clients.167
In Osborne, defendant argued that counsel was ineffective because he failed
to seek expert assistance to explain to the jury that substance abuse delirium
would have prohibited the defendant from forming the specific intent necessary
to support a first degree murder conviction.168 The Wyoming Supreme Court
based their decision of the ineffective assistance claim on the fact that there
was “overwhelming evidence” against Osborne.169 However, under New York’s
meaningful representation standard, it is possible that the Court could have
found defendant’s counsel ineffective. First, Osborne’s counsel failed to present
expert evidence, which could have been highly persuasive to the jury.170 Second,
Osborne’s only viable defense at trial was his voluntary intoxication.171 Without the
expert evidence, it raises the question of whether counsel took the necessary steps
to prove this defense. However, under New York’s approach, the Court would take
into consideration counsel’s trial strategies and reasons for making these decisions
during trial.172 Counsel took considerable steps to prove that Mr. Osborne was
severely intoxicated that evening.173 The jury instruction, additionally, informed
the jury that if his intoxicated condition left him unable to form the specific
intent to kill with premeditated malice, they had to find him not guilty of first
degree murder.174 An expert testifying on the stand that substance abuse delirium
would have prevented him from forming such intent could have convinced a
jury to acquit.175 Without an expert’s assurance, the jury might have hesitated in
concluding that Mr. Osborne’s alcohol and drug use affected his ability to form
the intent.

167
Id. § 1:5 (“[T]o a certain extent, the collegiality of the legal profession also inhibits courts
from taking action which may be viewed as a condemnation of the trial judge’s supervision.”).
168

Osborne, ¶ 23, 285 P.3d at 253.

169

Id. at ¶ 26, 285 P.3d at 253.

Neil Vidmar, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1121, 1125 (2001) (“Jurors
often abidicate their fact-finding obligation and simply ‘adopt’ the expert’s opinion . . . [B]ecause
experts often deal with esoteric matters of great complexity, jurors frequently are incapable of
critically evaluating the bases of an expert’s testimony and too often give unquestioning deference to
expert opinion.” (citations omitted)).
170

Id. at ¶ 18, 285 P.3d at 252 (“[Osborne] submits that substance abuse was clearly an issue
from the beginning in this case and voluntary intoxication was his only viable defense at trial.”).
171

172

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.

173

Id. at ¶¶ 21–22, 285 P.3d at 252–53.

174

Id. at ¶ 14, 285 P.3d at 251.

175

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 1, Art. 6

180

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

Use of the New York standard would have made proving Osborne’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim more reasonable. Under the Strickland standard,
defendant must show that an expert witness would have affected the outcome of
the case. Under the New York standard, defendant would need to show that he
was not afforded “meaningful representation” because counsel failed to provide
sufficient evidence to prove his only viable defense.176 The New York standard asks
that a reviewing court look to the totality of the circumstances.177 A court would
review Osborne’s counsel’s entire defense. The reviewing court would consider
the steps counsel took, proving that Osborne was intoxicated that evening. The
court would also consider the steps he did not take, proving through an expert
that his intoxication would have affected his ability to form the required mens
rea. Therefore, the New York standard provides a more accurate assessment of
counsel’s performance. Evaluating the ineffective assistance claim through the
New York standard requires a court to determine the fairness of the process as
a whole and more closely relates to Strickland ’s Sixth Amendment purpose—to
ensure a fair trial.

Conclusion
The right to counsel is an important component of the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a fair trial.178 “The right to counsel is not just about having a warm
body, any warm body stand beside a criminal defendant . . . .”179 The standard
needs to be an effective way of ensuring this constitutional right. The current
standard falters by dismissing the importance of the ineffective assistance claims
in weighing efficiency and finality over the meaningful assistance of counsel.
The standard needs to be changed in Wyoming because the prejudice prong
of the Strickland test is an arbitrary standard that is unreasonable to meet, and
the rationale behind the Strickland standard is flawed. A standard that considers
counsel’s representation as a whole better ensures a defendant’s right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. “For a court to be required to engage in speculation
about how the trial might have gone if counsel had been an effective advocate is
to minimize the importance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the
adversary system itself will suffer.”180

176

See supra notes 64 –68 and accompanying text.

177

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

178

See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.

See Burkoff & Burkoff, supra note 52, at § 1:1 n.5 (2012) (citing Abbe Smith, Carrying
On in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense is Not So Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 Clinical L.
Rev. 723, 735 (1995)).
179

180
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 625, 641 (1986).
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Appendix
Case

Ineffective
Counsel?

If not, which prong
was not met?

May v. State, 2003 WY 14, ¶44,
62 P.3d 574, 586 (Wyo. 2003).

No

Prejudice

Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶65,
62 P.3d 945, 965 (Wyo. 2003).

Yes

Page v. State, 2003 WY 23, ¶15,
63 P.3d 904, 910 (Wyo. 2003).

Yes

Robinson v. State, 2003 WY 32, ¶36, 		
No
64 P.3d 743 (Wyo. 2003).

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶88,
67 P.3d 536, 569 (Wyo. 2003).

No

Deficient Performance

Wilson v. State, 2003 WY 59, ¶11, 		
No
68 P.3d 1181, 1187-88 (Wyo. 2003).

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

DeShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶32,
74 P.3d 1240, 1253 (Wyo. 2003).

Yes

Vlahos v. State, 2003 WY 103, ¶48, 		
75 P.3d 628, 639-40 (Wyo. 2003).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶59,
76 P.3d 323, 342 (Wyo. 2003).

No

Prejudice

Daniels v. State, 2003 WY 132, ¶40,
78 P.3d 205, 218 (Wyo. 2003).

No

Prejudice

CLC v. State, 2004 WY 2, ¶12, 		
82 P.3d 1235, 1239 (Wyo. 2004).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, ¶2,
86 P.3d 851, 854 (Wyo. 2004).

Yes

Brown v. State, 2004 WY 57, ¶33,
90 P.3d 98, 108 (Wyo. 2004).

No

Prejudice

Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, ¶52,
94 P.3d 1034, 1053 (Wyo. 2004).

No

Prejudice
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Case

Ineffective
Counsel?

If not, which prong
was not met?

Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 102, ¶22,
96 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Wyo. 2004).

No

Deficient Performance

Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶81, 		
No
99 P.3d 928, 952 (Wyo. 2004).

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Rutti v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶32,
100 P.3d 394, 408 (Wyo. 2004).

No

Prejudice

Blakeman v. State, 2004 WY 139, ¶37,
100 P.3d 1229, 1238 (Wyo. 2004).

No

Deficient Performance

Barnes v. State, 2004 WY 146, ¶12,
100 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wyo. 2004).

No

Prejudice

Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶20,
106 P.3d 873, 879 (Wyo. 2005).

No

Deficient Performance

Siler v. State, 2005 WY 73, ¶39, 		
115 P.3d 14, 34 (Wyo. 2005).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶1,
115 P.3d 1110, 1112 (Wyo. 2005).

Yes

Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, ¶17, 		
121 P.3d 127, 134 (Wyo. 2005).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Marshall v. State, 2005 WY 164, ¶11,
125 P.3d 269, 274 (Wyo. 2005).

No

Deficient Performance

Martinez v State, 2006 WY 20, ¶38, 		
128 P.3d 652, 667 (Wyo. 2006).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Reichert v. State, 2006 WY 62, ¶44-45, 		
134 P.3d 268, 280-81 (Wyo. 2006).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶59,
141 P.3d 106, 123 (Wyo. 2006).

No

Deficient Performance

Magallanes v. State, 2006 WY 119, ¶27,
142 P.3d 1147, 1155 (Wyo. 2006).

No

Deficient Performance

Floyd v. State, 2006 WY 135, ¶16,
144 P.3d 1233, 1239 (Wyo. 2006).

No

Prejudice
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Case

Ineffective
Counsel?

If not, which prong
was not met?

Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶20,
152 P.3d 376, 383 (Wyo. 2007).

No

Deficient Performance

Poole v. State, 2007 WY 33, ¶10,
152 P.3d 412, 415 (Wyo. 2007).

No

Deficient Performance

Strandlien v. State, 2007 WY 66, ¶1,
156 P.3d 986, 988-89 (Wyo. 2007).

Yes

Lessard v. State, 2007 WY 89, ¶32,
158 P.3d 698, 706 (Wyo. 2007).

No

Deficient Performance

Wease v. State, 2007 WY 176, ¶61, 		
170 P.3d 94, 116 (Wyo. 2007).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Rion v. State, 2007 WY 197, ¶3, 		
172 P.3d 734, 736 (Wyo. 2007).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Palmer v. State, 2008 WY 7, ¶24,
174 P.3d 1298, 1304 (Wyo. 2008).

No

Prejudice

Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶22,
180 P.3d 212, 219 (Wyo. 2008).

No

Prejudice

Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶36,
184 P.3d 687, 698 (Wyo. 2008).

No

Prejudice

Eaton v. State, 2008 WY 97, ¶184,
192 P.3d 36, 114 (Wyo. 2008).

No

Deficient Performance

Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶49,
193 P.3d 228, 245 (Wyo. 2008).

Yes

Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶28, 		
No
201 P.3d 434, 442 (Wyo. 2009).

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Cross v. State, 2009 WY 154, ¶10, 		
221 P.3d 972, 975 (Wyo. 2009).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Baker v. State, 2010 WY 6, ¶42,
223 P.3d 542, 558 (Wyo. 2010).

No

Prejudice

Luftig v. State, 2010 WY 43, ¶31,
228 P.3d 857, 867 (Wyo. 2010).

No

Prejudice
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Case

Ineffective
Counsel?

If not, which prong
was not met?

Jones v. State, 2010 WY 44, ¶21,
228 P.3d 867, 874 (Wyo. 2010).

No

Prejudice

Schrelbvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶50,
228 P.3d 874, 890 (Wyo. 2010).

No

Prejudice

Bloomer v. State, 2010 WY 88, ¶19,
233 P.3d 971, 976 (Wyo. 2010).

No

Prejudice

Rolle v. State, 2010 WY 100, ¶45,
236 P.3d 259, 276 (Wyo. 2010).

No

Deficient Performance

Carter v. State, 2010 WY 136, ¶24, 		
241 P.3d 476, 489 (Wyo. 2010).
No

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Rodriguez v. State, 2010 WY 170, ¶19,
245 P.3d 818, 824 (Wyo. 2010).

No

Deficient Performance

Robison v. State, 2011 WY 4, ¶8,
246 P.3d 259, 263 (Wyo. 2011).

No

Deficient Performance

Sanchez v. State, 2011 WY 77, ¶49,
253 P.3d 136, 149 (Wyo. 2011).

No

Prejudice

Jenkins v. State, 2011 WY 141, ¶1,
262 P.3d 552, 554 (Wyo. 2011).

No

Prejudice

Ken v. State, 2011 WY 167, ¶3,
267 P.3d 567, 569 (Wyo. 2011).

Yes

Brock v. State, 2012 WY 13, ¶22,
272 P.3d 933, 939 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Prejudice

Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶43,
275 P.3d 377, 395 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Prejudice

Peterson v. State, 2012 WY 17, ¶25, 		
No
270 P.3d 648, 655 (Wyo. 2012).

Deficient Performance
and Prejudice

Snow v. State, 2012 WY 18, ¶17,
270 P.3d 656, 661 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Prejudice

Maier v. State, 2012 WY 50, ¶25,
273 P.3d 1084, 1092 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Deficient Performance
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Case

Ineffective
Counsel?

If not, which prong
was not met?

Kramer v. State, 2012 WY 69, ¶15,
277 P.3d 88, 93 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Deficient Performance

Jacobsen v. State, 2012 WY 105, ¶2,
281 P.3d 356, 357 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Prejudice

Osborne v. State, 2012 WY 123, ¶26,
285 P.3d 248, 253 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Prejudice

Mersereau v. State, 2012 WY 125, ¶69,
286 P.3d 97, 122 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Deficient Performance

Mickelson v. State, 2012 WY 137, ¶27,
287 P.3d 750, 757 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Deficient Performance

Leonard v. State, 2012 WY 39, ¶13,
298 P.3d 170, 173 (Wyo. 2012).

No

Deficient Performance

Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶41,
301 P.3d 106, 122 (Wyo. 2013).

No

Prejudice
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